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Given the richness of Nietzsche’s texts and the variety of his concerns, picking just two key 
topics is no easy task.  I am going to focus on two issues that are both obvious and elusive: 
obvious, because they are some of Nietzsche’s central concerns, and elusive, because the 
literature hasn’t yet come to terms with these topics.  Nietzsche’s approach to these topics is 
distinctive, his arguments complex and interwoven, so that his discussions can appear 
incongruously varied, even contradictory.   
 
 First, how should we understand Nietzsche’s critique of morality? There is a cluster of 
questions concerning the status of Nietzsche’s critiques of moralities, values, cultures, and 
individuals. Nietzsche’s texts are overflowing with claims about the ways in which these things 
can flourish or be degenerate, can express ascending or declining life, can manifest heightened or 
impeded will to power, can be symptomatic of nihilism or of life-affirmation. But how should we 
understand these claims?  
 Let me break this question into several parts. First, it’s obvious that Nietzsche employs 
notions such as health, power, flourishing, and life when engaging in these critiques. He’ll tell us 
that a particular moral commitment is expressive of declining life, or that it undermines power, 
or that it is unhealthy, or that it leads us to negate life. So we have questions about how these 
concepts should be understood:  
• Are some of these concepts (health, power, life, flourishing, affirmation, etc.) more 
basic in the order of explanation? That is, does Nietzsche define some of these 
concepts in terms of the others? Might some of these concepts be reducible to others? 
• Are some of these concepts more basic in the order of justification? For example, 
does Nietzsche justify the normative status of health by appealing to the normative 
status of power?  
My own view is that will to power is basic in both the order of explanation and the order of 
justification. Thus, health, life, and flourishing are defined in terms of configurations of power; 
and the normative status of these notions is vouchsafed by their connection to power. However, I 
do not think these are straightforwardly reducible to one another: thus, being capable of 
affirming one’s life might tend to bear a certain relationship to willing power successfully, but 
these can also come apart. In any case, there’s a great deal of further work to be done on these 
topics. For example, Ian Dunkle, John Richardson, and Andrew Huddleston have offered 
fascinating analyses of Nietzsche’s notion of health and its connection to power (e.g., Dunkle, 
Nietzsche’s Will to Health (unpublished dissertation); Richardson, Nietzsche’s System, [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996]; Huddleston, “Nietzsche on the Health of the Soul,” Inquiry 60.1 
[2017]: 135-164). 
 But there’s also a third question: 
• Does Nietzsche attempt to offer any ultimate justification of his critical employment 
of these notions?  
Grant, for the sake of argument, that something like my interpretation is correct: Nietzsche 
defines flourishing and health in terms of power; and he says that we should care about 
flourishing and health because we care about power. Yet then we ask: Why should we care about 
power? After all, Nietzsche tells us that some of our deepest commitments (such as our valuation 
of compassion, dignity, equality, democracy, etc.) conflict with power. So, absent an argument 
showing why we should care about power, we can imagine individuals saying that the fact that 
valuing human equality conflicts with valuing power is a reason to reject power rather than 
equality.  
 So, in addition to asking how these notions relate to one another, we have to ask whether 
Nietzsche offers any ultimate justification for whichever notion he treats as basic in the order of 
justification (whether it be health, power, affirmation, etc., or some combination of these). Here, 
interpretations diverge widely. The postmodernist readings that were dominant in the eighties 
and nineties saw Nietzsche as lacking any real answer to this question: his views on metaphysics, 
epistemology, and so forth were supposed to rule out the possibility of providing theory-
independent arguments for normative claims. More recently, some of the commentators who 
emphasize Nietzsche’s naturalistic commitments have thought that these commitments rule out 
substantive arguments for ultimate normative commitments. So, on these readings, Nietzsche 
may prefer that people be healthy (as he defines health), or that they will power (in his technical 
sense), or that they realize aesthetically appealing lives (by his standards), but, to someone who 
doesn’t share his preferences for these things, Nietzsche has nothing to offer.  
 I find it hard to believe that this could be Nietzsche’s view: a thinker as subtle as 
Nietzsche, who spends his life critiquing and analyzing the preferences of those who favor 
various values, could hardly have been satisfied merely by voicing his own ungrounded 
preferences for various values. But if Nietzsche has something to offer—if he aspires to provide 
some argument in favor of our commitment to power, health, or some other notion—what might 
it look like? It’s obvious that Nietzsche rejects standard realist accounts, according to which 
values have some strong form of metaphysical objectivity. Instead, he claims that values are in 
some sense created by human beings; values are dependent on valuers. Now, there are many 
different ways of understanding what this could mean. On the crudest possible version, it would 
mean that preferences and values coincide: if I prefer something, it counts as a value for me. This 
is certainly too crude, so most philosophers who endorse these views think we can 
simultaneously maintain (i) that all values are created, and (ii) that we have some way of 
distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable values. The Kantian, for example, thinks that all 
values are created, but also that in virtue of valuing anything at all we commit ourselves to 
valuing our own capacity to bestow value; and this commitment to valuing our capacity to 
bestow value is supposed to be equivalent to a commitment to the Categorical Imperative, which 
in turn shows certain normative commitments to be acceptable and others unacceptable. Or, the 
prototypical British sentimentalist thinks that all values are created, but also thinks that certain 
human sentiments (usually sympathy or benevolence) constrain acceptable values for those with 
standard psychological configurations. So again, we have commitment to the claim that all 
values are created, coupled with the idea that we can offer rational argumentation in favor of 
certain values and against others. 
 Of course, Nietzsche rejects Kantianism and standard sentimentalism. My point is simply 
that a philosopher can maintain that all values are created while thinking that there is some way 
of distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable values. Nietzsche could, for example, accept a 
form of sentimentalism in which he treats will to power, striving for health, or some other widely 
shared motivational tendency as giving us grounds for distinguishing acceptable and 
unacceptable values. Or he could adopt some version of Aristotelian naturalism, according to 
which a specification of our nature entails a specification of what it is for us to flourish. Or he 
could endorse some non-Kantian version of constructivism or constitutivism; Alex Silk defends 
the former whereas I defend the latter. On my constitutivist interpretation, Nietzsche’s 
characterizations of will to power are attempts to show that drive-motivated actions exhibit a 
certain structural feature, a constitutive aim. I argue that this structural feature (will to power) is 
present to some degree in all actions and is ineradicable, which gives us reason to reject any 
values that undermine or conflict with it. Thus, we get a way of sorting acceptable and 
unacceptable values: the acceptable ones are conducive to, or at least not in pervasive conflict 
with, will to power, whereas the unacceptable ones are not.  
 These are complex issues and attempts to approach them are sometimes clouded by 
confusions. Let me mention two factors that often lead interpreters astray. The first is 
Nietzsche’s rejection of universalism: Nietzsche denies that there is a single way of life and a 
single set of values that is appropriate for all individuals. The second is the fact that Nietzsche 
frequently claims to be writing for the few, rather than the many. These features, either singly or 
in combination, lead some readers to think that Nietzsche’s evaluative claims are merely 
pronouncements for those who share his tastes. But that’s just a mistake: even if you’re writing 
for the few, you may be writing about issues that apply to the many. Even if you’re a proponent 
of a non-universalist ethical theory, you may offer rational argumentation in favor of it. 
 To illustrate this, consider a few lines from Henry Sidgwick: 
It may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to 
others… a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his 
conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep 
aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity 
of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands. (Henry Sidgwick, 
Methods of Ethics [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1874/1981], 489–90) 
Sidgwick is a paradigmatic moral philosopher, beloved of Parfit and other analytic ethicists, but 
he shares the Nietzschean desire to write for the few, to hide his conclusions from the many, and 
to have different sets of ethical ideals accepted by the many and by the few. This is just an 
illustration—Nietzsche obviously doesn’t share Sidgwick’s utilitarian commitments—but I hope 
it shows just how odd some of the inferences in the Nietzsche literature are. Who Nietzsche is 
writing for and whether he wants different populations to accept different ideals have no direct 
bearing on the justificatory questions.  
 Once we sort all of this out, though, we are left with a further problem. All of the notions 
that are plausible candidates for Nietzschean values are strikingly open-ended. Power, health, 
life-affirmation, and so forth do not name concrete, determinate ends. Moreover, whatever 
particular results they entail are going to vary across different types of individuals, giving us, for 
example, different results in the herd and in the exceptional individuals. What’s a danger to the 
many may be a panacea to the few, and conversely. How should we make sense of this? In 
general: 
• How exactly do Nietzsche’s evaluative commitments bear on individuals, cultures, 
values, commitments, and so on? 
Here’s one way in which they bear: Nietzsche articulates various pathologies that can be induced 
and exacerbated by our moral commitments, or more generally by our ways of conceptualizing 
the normative domain. Some of these are familiar: consider the discussion in GM of the way in 
which a certain understanding of agency, as libertarian freedom, attracts the weak and impotent 
while at the same time entrenching and magnifying that very impotence (see my article, “The 
Relevance of History for Moral Philosophy: A Study of Nietzsche’s Genealogy,” in Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, ed. Simon May [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011], 170–92). I think many of Nietzsche’s applications of his evaluative 
commitments take roughly that form: he thinks that some ways of conceptualizing morality, 
agency, consciousness, freedom, and so forth are not just idle intellectual errors, but are things 
that generate or promote individual and cultural pathologies. This is the sense in which morality 
can be dangerous: certain ways of conceptualizing the moral domain can draw out problems that 
might otherwise remain latent. Additionally, they can produce psychological and cultural defects 
that then become entrenched features of human life. Bernard Reginster (in his forthcoming book 
on GM) and Frederick Neuhouser (in several articles on “social pathology”) are doing extremely 
interesting work on these topics. Some of my recent work, on Nietzsche’s understanding of 
“higher values,” explores a related question: whether normative commitments can exhibit the 
same individual and social functions once they’re openly recognized as created, historically 
contingent, and rationally optional. I think we need much more work on these topics.  
 The second key issue in Nietzsche interpretation focuses on another question: How 
should we understand Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology? One of the richest veins in 
Nietzsche’s texts is his philosophical psychology. He famously tells us that psychology is the 
path to the fundamental problems. And he pursues those fundamental problems, in part by giving 
us accounts of drives, affects, selfhood, valuing, the consciousness/unconscious relationship, 
self-knowledge, self-opacity, and so on. But how are these to be understood? I’ve given an 
account of the overall structure of these concepts (The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, 
Agency, and the Unconscious [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016]). But much more remains 
to be done. We need explorations of Nietzsche’s analyses of particular emotions, affects, and 
drives; examinations of the pathologies that he thinks can be induced by certain configurations of 
affect; studies of Nietzsche’s frequent use of virtue terms; analyses of the way in which 
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology might give us arguments against contemporary theories of 
agency and motivation; and so on.  
 I’ll mention one issue in a bit more depth. I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche’s 
distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states should be understood as a 
difference in the structure of mental events rather than a difference in the awareness of those 
events (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization,” European Journal 
of Philosophy 13 [2005]: 1–31; for an improved interpretation, see The Nietzschean Self). Today, 
we typically use the term ‘conscious’ to pick out mental states that are actual or possible objects 
of introspective awareness. Nietzsche often (but not always) uses it differently: in key passages, 
such as GS 354, he claims that conscious and unconscious events differ in that the former, but 
not the latter, are linguistic or conceptual. The key point, for Nietzsche, is this: that with the 
emergence of language and concepts, the way in which our mental economies function is 
transformed in far-reaching ways.  
 Feuerbach wrote:  
The obtuse [geistlose] Materialist says: ‘Man is distinguished from the brute only by 
consciousness—he is an animal with consciousness superadded’; not reflecting, that in a 
being which awakes to consciousness, there takes place a qualitative change and 
differentiation of the entire nature. (Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot [New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1841/1989] 3 n. 1) 
All too many commentators treat Nietzsche as an obtuse materialist (or clumsy naturalist, as we 
might say today), neglecting the role of language and consciousness. In a way, this is 
astonishing: almost everything that occupies Nietzsche’s attention is a normatively characterized, 
interpretive phenomenon. From his earliest worries about the motivating forces in Greek culture 
and the crisis of self-understanding that they produced, to his concerns about meaning, aesthetic 
interpretation, and the possibility of affirmation, to his increasingly impassioned warnings about 
the dangers induced by ascetic morality, nihilism, and the loss of higher values, there is a 
pervasive concern with phenomena that can only arise for self-conscious, self-interpreting 
beings.  
 Of course, Nietzsche constantly emphasizes that we overestimate the conscious and 
underestimate the unconscious; he tells us that most of what we value, think, feel, and will is 
shaped and driven by unconscious factors. But commentators tend to slide from claims about the 
ubiquity and forcefulness of unconscious processes to claims about the unimportance or even the 
inertness of conscious processes. This simply does not follow. When Nietzsche warns us that 
we’ve focused solely on x and ignored y, he does not want us to make the opposite, equally naïve 
error of ignoring x and focusing solely on y. An explanation of Christianity’s role in European 
history, or Renaissance humanism’s impact on early modernity, or the ascetic tendencies present 
in modern ideals, which attempted to ignore conscious interpretations or treat them as 
epiphenomenal (in any interesting sense) would be ludicrous. And Nietzsche knows this.  
(An interpretive interlude: I say epiphenomenal in any interesting sense because it’s 
possible to define epiphenomenalism in such a way that it becomes inconsequential. For 
example, suppose we define epiphenomenalism about consciousness as the view that the causal 
efficacy of a mental state M doesn’t depend on M’s being conscious. This sort of claim, which 
has recently been defended in the literature, doesn’t rule out any interesting philosophical theses. 
For example, it’s compatible with the claim that acquiring or forming M requires M’s being 
conscious; it’s compatible with the idea that only conscious creatures can have M; it’s 
compatible with even the most hyperintellectualist theories of agency, such as Korsgaard’s 
version of Kant.  And let me take this opportunity to interject, without defense, an interpretive 
principle: Nietzsche is interested in offering precise philosophical distinctions only when they 
make a difference, only when they do important work.)  
 People are conscious, interpreting animals, and these conscious interpretations often 
distort their object. But these distortions are not idle: they influence the nature of the interpreted 
object. To conceive of ourselves as sinful and guilty, for example, doesn’t make it so: but it does 
alter our relationship to our own activities, the emotions that we experience, the cultural 
institutions that we take part in, the values that we are inclined to embrace, and so on. We need 
more work analyzing the particular ways in which this occurs. (I explore some of these points in 
my “Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual Experience,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 26.1 [2018]: 525–45). And there is, incidentally, a body of brilliant and 
underappreciated work on this general topic. In the aftermath of Nietzsche, some of the early 
German sociologists including Georg Simmel, Max Weber, and Max Scheler applied 
Nietzschean insights to analyze cultural phenomena. Many of their works are staggeringly 
insightful. They can serve as models for Nietzschean critiques of moral and cultural phenomena. 
Unfortunately, few philosophers—and fewer Nietzscheans—read these works. 
 I have mentioned two central areas for further research in Nietzsche scholarship: the 
status of his critiques of morality and analysis of his philosophical psychology. Let me close by 
mentioning one thing that I wish Nietzsche scholarship would move away from: fear of 
emphasizing Nietzsche’s distinctiveness. Until quite recently, Nietzsche was not widely regarded 
as one of the giants of philosophy: he was not set alongside Kant, Hume, Plato, Aristotle, and so 
on. That has changed, or at least has begun to change. But it bred an insecurity that is still 
manifest in the literature. A large segment of the Nietzsche literature focuses on showing that 
Nietzsche is important because he said x and someone else who is thought to be important also 
says x. Thus, we have writers on Nietzsche whose highest aspiration is to show that Nietzsche 
anticipates some (soon to be overturned) claim in contemporary empirical psychology, or that his 
theory of x is analogous to “leading philosopher so-and-so’s” musings, or that he develops an 
idea that Hume or some other widely respected philosopher also develops. This uncritical 
deference to contemporary philosophical and psychological fashions is something that Nietzsche 
himself derided. Aside from that, the rewards of these readings tend to be exceptionally low. At 
best, Nietzsche turns out to be someone who offered an obscure, fumbling anticipation of some 
view that contemporary philosophers or psychologists state with much greater clarity and 
precision. If that is all Nietzsche has to offer, only an antiquarian interest would lead us to read 
him. But manifestly this is not all that Nietzsche has to offer. The most interesting Nietzsche 
scholarship abjures this deferential approach and explores Nietzsche’s ideas in their own right. 
